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INTRODUCTION
Ten times, at _least, the City ofldaho Falls (the City) falsely states in Respondent's Brief
that the water line at issue in this case was within its useful life. And yet, the City's own expert
states, "[d]escriptions of the types of breaks and repairs performed on the 1950s-era cast iron
pipe include ... clamp-type repairs of rusting and cracked pipelines .... indicat[ing] that the
material is past its design life and is (sic) need ofreplacement." 1 The City similarly repeatedly
and incorrectly asserts that it was not on notice of any defect in its water pipes. And yet, the
City's own expert reached his conclusion about the design life by relying upon roughly 30 years
of data regarding the location, date, and description of water main breaks in its system revealing
that 70% of the breaks occur in cast iron pipe installed between 1920 and 1959. 2 Again, the City
repeatedly asserts that it was not on notice of any waterline breaks on the west side of Idaho Falls
near 547 South Skyline Drive. And yet, per the City's own engineer, one year prior and less than
a mile away from the break at issue, there was a break in the main of the same material installed
at the same time just around the corner on Stimson Avenue. 3 The City's position is built upon a
fiction, a denial by the City of critical facts, all established from the City's own evidence and
experts.
The City's position is also built upon a similar denial about the law, a refusal to
acknowledge the well settled public policy of this state that an operator of a public water system
has a duty to maintain that system in a reasonably safe condition. And yet, the law is clear. Every
1 R,

p. 245.

z Id.
3

R, p. 127.

1

public utility is required to maintain its instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities in a safe
condition. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 61-302; Hansen v. City of Pocatello, 145 Idaho 700, 184 P.3d
206 (2008).
This Court should reject the City's denial about the state of the law and state of the facts.
The evidence presented to the district court by Lamont Bair Enterprises, Inc. (LBE) revealed a
failure on the part of the City to exercise due care in the performance of a public policy
established obligation to maintain its public works in a reasonably safe condition. As a
consequence, summary judgment was granted in error and this Court should remand this matter
back to the district court for further proceedings.

ARGUMENT
When a government agency negligently fails to carry out an operational responsibility, it
is liable for that negligence and the immunity provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA)
afford it no protection. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-904(1). Neither discretionary function nor design
immunity applies to a negligent failure to maintain public works facilities in a safe condition.
Because the City failed its operational duty to maintain its water system in a safe condition, the
district court erred in finding discretionary function immunity. Because LBE's claim arises from
that negligent failure to maintain the system, not from any allegation of negligent design of that
system, design immunity would have been, and is, an equally inappropriate basis for summary
judgment.

2

I. Maintenance of public works in a reasonably safe condition is not discretionary and the
City failed to exercise ordinary care in the performance of a statutory or regulatory
function.

This district court erred in granting the City immunity with respect to the maintenance of
its public water system because the City acted negligently in the implementation of existing
policy. The City's continued reliance upon the two-step approach for determining if a
govermnent act is discretionary or operational is misplaced. The existence of a clearly articulated
policy obviates the application of that two-step approach because the question is not whether
there is room for policy judgment and decision, but whether the City failed to exercise due care
in the implementation of statutory or regulatory policy. This case does not deal with operational
decision making, but implementation of policy, and "[t]he discretionary function exception does
not immunize the negligent implementation of policy[.]" Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sch. Dist.
No. 231, 116 Idaho 326, 331, 775 P.2d 640, 645 (1989). When there is an existing policy already

in place, the execution of that policy is not discretionary, but operational, and the operational
prong demands that the policy be carried out with ordinary care. Id. at 330, 644.
Like all other exceptions to liability under the ITCA, the discretionary function immunity
exception must be closely construed to favor liability and to limit the exceptions. Grabicki v. City
of Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 690, 302 P.3d 26, 30 (2013). Section 6-904(1) provides:

A govermnental entity ... shall not be liable for any claim which:
Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity
exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a
statutory or regulatory function, whether or not the statute or regulation be valid,
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee
thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused.

3

IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-904 (1).
The City not only glosses over, but completely disregards the first half of the statute,
electing instead to jump to an analysis of whether the City performed a discretionary function.
But the execution or performance of a statutory or regulatory function is never discretionary. The
correct first question, therefore, is whether the City was negligent in the performance of a
statutory or regulatory function. Because the answer is yes, the City is not entitled to
discretionary function immunity. It is the settled policy of this state that an operator of water
supply public works has a duty to maintain those public works in a safe condition. Hansen v. City
of Pocatello, 145 Idaho 700, 703, 184 P.3d 206, 209 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 61-302.

The City is critical of LBE's reliance upon Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. v. City of Idaho
Falls, 90 Idaho 1,407 P.2d 695 (1965) and CC. Anderson Stores Co. v. Boise Water Corp., 84

Idaho 355,372 P.2d 752 (1962), suggesting that the adoption the ITCA in 1971 somehow altered
the public policy of this state as it relates to the maintenance of public works water systems.
Specifically, the City argues:
LBE asse1is that because this Court did not apply the immunity to the municipal
entities in Skaggs and C. C. Anderson, there must be a public policy prohibiting
its application. When viewed in this context, this assertion is absurd. Skaggs and
C. C. Anderson were both decided of this Court prior to the state legislature's
enactment of the Idaho Tort Claims Act in 1971. Consequently, the laws and
immunities available to municipal entities were vastly different at that time. In
light of the Idaho Tort Claims, those cases represent outdated, inapposite law, not
"well-established public policy." 4

4

Respondent's Brief, p. 11.
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There are a number of flaws with this argument. First, the only truly absurd assertion is that the
adoption of the ITCA somehow altered public policy as it relates to public works water systems.
Nothing about the ITCA alters long-standing public policy regarding a public utility's obligation
to maintain its facilities and equipment in a safe condition.
More importantly, LBE does not rely on Skaggs and C. C. Anderson to suggest there is a
public policy prohibiting the application of the discretionary immunity doctrine. Indeed, that is
not LB E's argument at all. LBE does not contend that public policy prohibits application of the
immunity doctrine, but rather because public policy requires it, a public utility's duty to maintain
its water system in a safe condition is not discretionary. And because it is not discretionary,
discretionary immunity does not apply. As noted above, "[t]he discretionary function exception
does not immunize the negligent implementation of policy[.]" Czaplicki, 116 Idaho at 331, 775

P.2d at 645.
Contrary to the City's contention, LBE does not rely on Skaggs and C. C. Anderson to
establish the underlying public policy, but its existence is nonetheless certain. The policy was
determined by the legislature in 1913 when it adopted Section 61-302 and its ongoing existence
was affirmed by this Court in Hansen thirty-seven years after the adoption of the ITCA. The
City's protestations aside, the law and public policy of this state demands that the operator of a
water utility maintain its equipment and facilities in a safe condition. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 61302; Hansen, supra. And because public policy requires that maintenance, the City's duty to
maintain its system in a safe condition is not discretionary. The City negligently ignored literally
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decades of warnings about the condition of its system, and discretionary function does not
immunize its negligent implementation of settled policy.
In addition to disregarding, and even denying, the existence of this well settled policy, the
City misreads Jones v. City of St. Maries, 111 Idaho 733, 727 P.2d 1161 (1986), to reach the
erroneous conclusion that "the Court has already determined that the immunity is available when
dealing with water systems." 5 On the contrary, the Jones court specifically declined to apply
discretionary immunity in Jones and reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and
remanded the case "for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein." Jones v.
City ofSt. Maries, 111 Idaho at 737, 727 P.2d at 1165. Among the views expressed, the Jones

court held that if a city assumes the responsibility for maintaining water mains, "then it would be
obligated to perform those activities with due care and would be correspondingly liable for any
failure to do so." Id. When the City ofidaho Falls decided to become a public utility, it subjected
itself to the requirements of the Public Utilities Law and assumed the responsibility for
maintaining its water mains, including the obligation to maintain its facilities in a safe condition.
Having assumed that responsibility, it is liable for its failure to maintain its facilities with due
care. Discretionary immunity under Section 6-904(1) does not apply. As such, the District Court
erred in granting summary judgment.

A. The City's own records establish the City's negligence.
In addition to denying the existence of its obligation to maintain its water system in a safe
condition, the City contends there is no evidence to support a finding of negligence with respect
5

Respondent's Brief, p. 11.
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to that obligation. Specifically, the City maintains that it lacked any actual or constructive notice
of any defects or breaks in its waterline. The City's position is not supported by the evidence.
The City maintains that the pipe in question was "within its expected useful life of 7 5
years. " 6 While it is accurate to suggest the pipe was within its expected useful life, that does not
end the inquiry. First, "the city is bound to take notice that its pipes are liable to deteriorate from
time and use[.]"Yearsley v. City of Pocatello, 71 Idaho 347, 353, 231 P.2d 743, 747 (1951). And
more importantly, the city had actual notice that the pipe in question had already deteriorated
past its design life, irrespective of what its expected life may have been. It cannot be disputed the
City had this notice as its Water Facility Plan states:
The City has recorded the location, date, and description of water main breaks and
repairs since the mide-1980s. This information is invaluable for determining
generally what type and age of pipe is breaking and should be scheduled for
replacement. . . . The break counts indicate that cast iron pipeline installed
between 1920 and 1959 accounts for approximately 70% of the City's breaks or
repairs. Descriptions of the types of breaks and repairs performed on the 1950sera cast iron pipe include many joint leak repairs and clamp-type repairs of
rusting and cracked pipelines. These failures indicate that the material is past its
design life and is (sic) of replacement. 7
The record further reveals that nearly half of the breaks were to cast iron pipe installed between
1940 and 1959, the very type of pipe at issue in this case. 8 The City, in what was hopefully an
oversight and not an outright misrepresentation, attempts to downplay this evidence by
suggesting "the waterline at issue here was not in need of 'clamp-type repairs of rusting and
cracked pipelines,' but rather experienced a shear break of the piping caused by shifting soils due
6

Respondent's Brief, p. 22 (emphasis added).

7

R, p. 245.

8

Id.
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to deep frost penetration."9 This Court must reject this contention as the record clearly
establishes that the break was, in fact, a cracked pipe repaired with a clamp-type repair. Of the
break at issue, David Richards (Richards) testified:
Q. Do you know what kind of break it was?
A. It's basically that if pressure gets applied to a pipe, that the pipe itself cracks
completely around the full circumference of the pipe and it separates, it's called a
sheer break.

Q. Okay. So can you tell, based on this document, how the repair was performed?
A. Yes. They dug down to the broken main. It was approximately four feet deep.
They used a 16-inch diameter by 12-inches long full circle clamp for a cast iron
pipe. It's just a sleeve that goes over the pipe with a rubber gasket on the inside to
seal it up. 10
In other words, the break and repair to the pipe at issue in this case was a crack repaired
with a clamp-type repair, precisely the type of break that lead the City's own expert to conclude
the cast iron pipes installed from 1920-1959 were past their design life. The City had actual
notice that the pipe in question was past its design life.
The City attempts to distinguish the present case from Skaggs, supra, where this Court
reasoned:
The City's policy with respect to the maintenance, repair and replacement of the
pipelines was to wait until a break or leak was reported and then dispatch a crew
to make the necessary repairs. The City took no steps whatsoever to prevent leaks
caused by rusting, nor did it institute any procedures or practices to inspect or
check the lines prior to an actual break.
9

Respondent's Brief, p. 24.

10

R, p. 128-129.
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Skaggs, 90 Idaho at 1, 6-7, 407 P.2d at 697 (emphasis in original). The City contends that the
present case is distinguishable because it "has a plan to replace its waterlines before they exceed
their life expectancy and does not wait until leaks occur before making repairs."' 1 Once again,
the record does not support the City's conclusion. First, we know the City's plan is not to replace
waterlines before they exceed life expectancy, but rather to replace, over the course of the next
15 years, many miles of cast-iron pipe that is already "past its design life." Moreover, waiting
until a leak occurred before making repairs is precisely what the City did in this case. The City
knew as of the adoption of the Water Facility Plan, and had reason to know before it was written,
that the pipe at issue was past its design life, but waited until a leak occurred to do anything
about it. And finally, just as the Court noted in Skaggs, per Richards, the City has no procedures
or practices to inspect or check lines for leaks prior to an actual break. 12
While the City contends LBE produced no evidence of negligence, the contention simply
is not accurate. Although it all came from the City's own records, LBE produced ample evidence
from which a jury could conclude the City negligently failed to perform its statutory and public
policy obligation to maintain its water facilities in safe condition. Specifically, the City ignored
years of warning signs 13 and neglected to prepare or plan for known potential problems until the
City's cast-iron pipe installed between 1940 and 1959 was beyond its design life. As a matter of
law, the City was on notice that pipes will deteriorate. Yearsley, supra. A jury could readily
conclude that the City's disregard for decades of warning signs regarding the actual deterioration
11

Respondent's Brief, p. 24.

12

R, p. 126.

13

R, p. 245.
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of its cast-iron pipes was a breach of its duty to maintain the water facilities in a safe condition.
Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment.
B. Res ipsa loquitur precludes summary judgment on LBE's negligence claim.
Even in the absence of the foregoing direct evidence of the City's negligence, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to this case and supports a finding of negligence. As
previously briefed, the doctrine allows a jury to draw an inference of negligence when: ( 1) the
agency or instrumentality causing injury is under the exclusive control of the defendant; and (2)
the circumstances are such that common knowledge and experience justify an inference that the
injury would not happen in the absence of negligence. Wing v. Clark's Air Serv., Inc., 106 Idaho
806, 807, 683 P.2d 842,843 (1984).
While acknowledging the pipe in question was in its exclusive control, the City maintains
that the doctrine does not apply because the pipe conformed with engineering standards. But
whether the pipe conformed with engineering standards is a disputed question of fact and cannot
support the district court's summary judgment. It is disputed because: (1) the only evidence of
that conclusion is Richards' unfounded testimony; and (2) that testimony is contradicted by the
City's own expert in the Water Facility Report conclusions.
The evidence in question is the very same testimony at issue on appeal of the district
court's denial of LBE's motion to strike, Richards' conclusory and unfounded testimony that the
pipe in question conformed with engineering standards on December 28, 2015. Fatal to that
conclusory testimony is that Richards has never seen the pipe in question. 14 "Expert opinion

14

R, pp. 125-126.
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must be based upon a proper factual foundation." State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744,419 P.3d 1042,
1077 (2018) (quoting Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807,811,979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999)).
Without physically observing the pipe in question, Richards cannot possibly rebut the Water
Facility Report conclusion that the City's cast-iron pipes installed between 1940 and 1959 were
beyond their design life.
Furthermore, uncontested evidence from Richards' testimony suggests that the pipe in
question was compromised. Richards testified, "The subsoil west of the Snake River is soft and
sandy creating an environment that is easy on water lines." 15 This important fact supports a
conclusion that the pipe in question was, as the Water Facility Report states, beyond its design
life, else why would the pipe have sustained a circumferential shear crack? That the City suffered
two failures in approximately one-year in this area where the soils are soft, and sandy, and easy
on water lines, serves to confirm, or at least corroborate, the Water Facility Report conclusion
that the pipe was beyond its design life.
Even if this Court were to deny LBE's appeal of the motion to strike, Richards' testimony
regarding the pipe in question is disputed by the City's own Water Facility Plan. As a
consequence, a jury could reject Richards' conclusory statement and find that the break in
question would not have happened in the absence of negligence, specifically the City's failure to
monitor its pipes of deterioration beyond their design life. Accordingly, summary judgment was
not proper and the district court's decision should be reversed.

15

R, p. 25.
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II. There are no alternative grounds on which summary judgment should be affirmed.

The City continues to advance its argument for design immunity pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 6-904(7). Fatal to this argument are two inescapable realities. First, LBE's claim does not arise

out of the Water Facility Plan; and second, the pipe in question was not installed pursuant to that
plan.
Where a plaintiffs claim arises out of an alleged negligent plan or design on the
part of a governmental entity, the entity is entitled to immunity under LC. § 6904(7), if the entity can "establish (1) the existence of a plan or design that was
(2) either prepared in substantial conformance with existing engineering or design
standards or approved in advance of construction by the legislative or
administrative authority."
Woodworth v. State ex rel. Idaho Transp. Bd., 154 Idaho 362,364,298 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2013)

(quoting Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454,459, 886 P.2d 330, 335 (1994)).
The City maintains that it can meet the second and third elements of this test, but it fails
to address and cannot meet the important, but un-enumerated, first element. Immunity under
Section 6-904(7) only applies, "[w]here a plaintiff's claim arises out of an alleged negligent plan
or design on the part of a governmental entity." Woodworth, supra. LBE's claim does not arise
out of any alleged negligence with respect to any plan or design set forth in the Water Facility
Plan. Indeed, it is and has always been LBE's position that the City's negligence occurred well in
advance of the adoption of the plan. The plan merely serves to confirm the existence of that
negligence by establishing that the City had allowed its water facilities to fall into a state of
profound disrepair. The negligence had already occurred and the City cannot escape the
consequences of its negligence by the adoption of a plan after the fact. Because LB E's

12

negligence claim does not arise out of the Water Facility Plan, that plan cannot be relied upon to
establish immunity under Section 6-904(7).
As the district court correctly concluded, "LBE's claim is not based on any claim that the
Brentwood pipe's design was flawed." 16 Similarly, the claim is not based on any claim that the
plan or design for the installation of that pipe was flawed . Section 6-904(7) does not provide the
City immunity from LB E's claim of negli gent ma intenance, the district court correctly denied
summary j udgment on this point, and the City's request that summary judgment be affirmed on
this alternative ground should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, LBE respectfully reiterates its request for a reversal of the
decisions of the District Court.
Dated: September 12, 2018.

eard t. lair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for Appellant
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